No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'. It is in the area of civil rights that the two Strasbourg bodies have relied primarily upon this Article: the bulk of the applications dealt with by the two supervisory bodies relate to the conditions of detention of persons deprived of their liberty (usually in prisons, in police custody or in mental institutions). Other applications raise the question whether corporal punishment in educational institutions can be regarded as inhuman and degrading, or whether extradition or deportation to a country where an individual is likely to be subjected to inhuman treatment is contrary to Article 3. In addition, the question has also been raised whether -at least in some instances -racial discrimination can be said to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Francine van Volsem, a Belgian national born in 1950
, obtained the custody of her two children following her divorce. Being depressive and suffering from near-chronic respiratory problems, she was unable to hold a stable job. She therefore relied for her living on the alimony paid by her former husband. In addition, she lived on the social security provided by a social welfare centre (C.P.A-S.: 'Centre public d'aide sociale'). With the help of this Centre she had managed to obtain accommodation in a half empty block of council flats. In these, everything, and particularly the heating, ran on electricity, in addition, as the flats had been badly built, the consumption of electricity was very high. It should therefore come u no surprise that between 1981 and 1983 Mrs van Volsem was unable to meet the cost of her electricity bills. The C.P.A.S. took no notice of a request by Mrs van Volsem to provide financial help, or to at least support her case with the electricity company, SA. Unerg. Thus the company cut off the electricity on 9 December 1983 (a very inappropriate period indeed). Mrs van Volsem took legal proceedings against this measure. The Brussels Tribunal of First Instance upheld her case (and the electric power was restored), but subsequently, on 25 February 1988, the Brussels Court of Appeal authorized S.A. Unerg to cut off the power. The company acted immediately upon this judicial order, in spite of the fact that meanwhile -it was now 14 May 1988 -Mrs van Volsem was caring for her grandchild and a doctor had issued a medical certificate stating that owing to respiratory problems the child needed a minimum level of heating. In the event, thanks to the intervention of a bank (the C.P.A.S. had refused any help), Mrs van Volsem was able to comply with the request of die company to pay the arrears and promised to pay future bills regularly: on 15 September 1988 the company reconnected her power, although at very low intensity (only two Amperes, producing a power of 440 Watts).3
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In the application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights, Mrs van Volsem claimed, among other things, that: 1) the electricity company was not a private enterprise; indeed, it was a public utility ('service public') and acted as representative ('mandataire') of the association of district councils, which in turn were to be regarded as representatives of the Belgian State; consequently, the measures taken by the company were to be imputed to the Belgian State; 2) the cutting off of electricity in a very cold period and subsequently the supply of a low power voltage amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, proscribed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In this respect, the applicant drew the European Commission's attention to two points. First, she had never demanded free electricity; she had merely been unable to cover all the high electricity expenses regularly. Secondly, the company itself had conceded in its brief before the Brussels Court of Appeal that 'the provision of gas and electricity must be regarded in our State as based on the rule of law and in our community as indispensable to human dignity*/ The petitioner concluded that, since the European Convention 'guarantees in Article 3 the right for everybody to have the basic goods indispensable for ensuring human dignity'J the Belgian authorities had meted out inhuman and degrading treatment, by cutting off the electric power in the past and by threatening to do so in the future. As regards the question relating to Article 3, the Committee of three confined itself to making two points. First, it stressed that the question could arise of whether the severing of electric power should be imputed to the Belgian State. However, there was no need to delve into this issue, for in any event the petition was to be rejected on other grounds. Second, regarding the allegation that the measure complained of amounted to an inhuman or degrading treatment, the Committee stated that 'in the case at issue, the cutting off or the threat of cutting off electricity did not reach the level of humiliation or debasement needed for there to be inhuman or degrading treatment' ? 4. It is apparent from this decision that the Committee did not rule out the possibility of applying Article 3 to a case where social and economic conditions rather than alleged misbehaviour of public authorities impinging upon the area of civil rights were at stake. In other words, the Committee did not dismiss out of hand the contention that Article 3 also bans any social and economic treatment of persons that is so humiliating as to amount to inhuman treatment.
On this SCOTC the decision of the Committee cannot but be approved. It stands to reason that the scope of Article 3 is very broad; nothing could warrant its possible limitation to only physical or psychological mistreatment in the area of civil rights. Plainly, the concept of human dignity underpinning Article 3 and the prohibition of any treatment or punishment contrary to humanitarian principles embrace any measure or action by a public authority, whatever the specific field to which this measure or action appertains. Article 3 could therefore constitute an appropriate means for the Commission and the Court to make, if only in extreme cases, the protection of economic and social rights more incisive. It could constitute the bridge between the area traditionally covered by the Convention, hence guaranteed by the Commission and the Court -that of civil and political rights -and the broad field of social and economic rights. The Committee's decision is however disappointing in two other -closely intertwined -respects. treatment to be regarded as inhuman or degrading. When pronouncing on these difficult cases international bodies must perforce retain a large measure of discretion. Nevertheless, they ought at least to set out the 'indicators' they actually take into account when assessing a certain situation. In the case at issue, one may well wonder whether the Committee of three turned its attention to the economic conditions of the applicant, to her mental and physical state (in particular, to her being depressive and suffering from near-chronic respiratory troubles), to her having charge of two children and a grandchild, or to the attitude of the social welfare centre (the C.P.A.S.). Did the Committee ask itself whether in the area where Mrs van Volsem lived it was easy for a person in her conditions, or for her elder daughter, to find a job? Did it consider that the measures taken by the electricity company (cutting off of the power, and consequent supply of a derisory power flow coupled with the threat of a further cut-off) may have a different psychological or moral impact on persons, depending on their physical and psychological conditions? In addition, did the Committee attach any importance to the intent, or lack of intent, of meting out inhuman and degrading treatment?
One should assume that, in ruling the way it did, the Committee of three took into account most of these issues, perhaps others also. One may wonder why it refrained from indicating its methodology concerning its balancing of all the relevant circumstances.
Had the European Commission considered the application lodged by Mrs van
Volsem in greater detail, it could have broken new ground, even if it eventually were to conclude that the application was inadmissible. It is a matter of regret that the Commission has missed this significant opportunity.
One of the consequences of the Commission's failure to make a searching examination of the case should be emphasized: the Commission has left all those who might be interested in invoking Article 3, owing to their dire economic or social conditions, without any yardstick by which to appraise whether or not they are entitled to benefit from that all-important provision.
